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The law of business competition springs from ancient sources.
Centuries intervene between the days of barter and the modern
epoch of vast industrial organization. The history of those cen-
turies tells an interesting tale of the efforts of governments and
courts to control the conduct of men in the rivalries of trade.
Harsh repressive action, futile attempts by legislative fiat to stop
the irresistible force of economic development and the operation
of the law of supply and demand, government price fixing and
licensing systems, public policies ranging from the most minute
regulation to complete freedom from any governmental inter-
ference, are found in the law books of the centuries. The influ-
ence of the church, the writings of great economists, the ideas of
powerful rulers, the dire necessities of starving masses of the
people,--many divergent influences have together shaped the
basic principles underlying the law of business competition.
These principles were finally embodied in statutes and court de-
cisions. To understand the legal rules governing modern com-
petition we must not only look to two great sources of legal
information,--the common law evolved by the courts and the stat-
utory law as interpreted by them,-but also to the economic con-
ditions which gave them birth. Throughout the law we find a
steadily enlarging prohibition of two general classes of acts affect-
img competition. The first group have come to be known as
monopolies and restraints of trade. The second group are those
acts which the law calls unfair methods of competition.
The history of Anglo-Saxon peoples discloses an undying hos-
tility toward monopoly. The records of ancient times recount the
efforts of kings and judges to prevent monopolistic practices in
local markets and fairs. As trade develops, we find the people
struggling against the monopoly of local trade vested in the
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guilds of freemen in the towns. Still later, a hostile Commons
backed by an irate public dares to stand against the imperious
will of Queen Elizabeth in her efforts to establish national mo-
nopolies by grant to her court favorites. Then we see the great
monopolistic trading companies organized to conduct the foreign
trade of the nation forced out of existence by the demands of
the people. Finally we witness the abolition of tariffs, bounties
and similar devices designed to foster control of domestic in-
dustries and the establishment of free trade as a national policy.
In the infancy of our existence as a sovereign nation, the prin-
ciple of free, unrestricted competition was established as a basic
policy in English trade and commerce.
FORESTALLING THE MARKET
Efforts to prevent monopoly and restraint of trade in the local
markets appear in the earliest legal records of England. Be-
tween the twelfth and fourteenth centuries domestic trade was in
large part carried on at fairs and markets." The markets were
usually held once a week, and furnished a place where the prod-
uce and wares o4 the neighborhood could be bought and sold.
The fairs which developed after William the Conqueror were
great institutions held for periods varying from several days to
a month. To them came Spaniards, Venetians, Flemings and
merchants from every corner of Europe, with linens, silks, spices,
furs, wines and all the luxuries of life. Fairs and markets could
only be held by grant of the Crown.2 They afforded a safe place
to trade, for both the King and the Church extended their pro-
tection to them. Thus in the charter granted by the King au-
thorizing the fair at St. Ives appears those words, "I will and
ordain that all who come to the fair, remain at it, and return
from it, have my firm peace." 3
As most of the early grants were to religious bodies, the power-
ful protection of the Church was also secured. In fact so friendly
was the Church, that buying and selling of merchandise often
took place in the churches and their adjacent cemeteries, even on
Sundays, to the great scandal of pious people. Lipson quotes
from an ancient petition by folks, not so pious, who had held
their meat market in the churchyard before service on Sunday,
wherein they complained of their vicar who it seems one Sunday
"in a very outrageous manner, ill-becoming a man of the church"
had thrown the meat of a butcher on the ground "most pitiful to
behold," had then threatened to kill the butcher even "if he
hanged for it half an hour afterwards" and then to make life
harder for his parishioners preached to them "in a most melan-
: Lipson, An Introduction to the Economic History of England (1915)
chap. vi.
2 Coke, Institutes, *220; Blackstone, Commentaries, *274.
3 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 198.
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choly and angry vein" until they did "wish themselves at home."
In an age when militarism was rampant, government was wealk
and robbers infested the country, such centers naturally drew
traders to them. No markets were permitted within six and
two-thirds miles of each other.4
Where the fair was held in a town the municipal authorities
surrendered their authority during the life of the fair. Stalls
were set up, and traders in the same commodity were grouped
together, partly for the convenience of the buyers to promote
competition. The fair had its own court, called the "pie powder
court," or "court of the dusty feet" to assure prompt justice to
merchants attending the fair3 As trade slowly developed, these
agencies offered to the King regular channels through which
trade could be directed and regulated, and revenue secured. The
owners of the markets or fairs usually exacted tolls on sales and
a charge known as stallage for space for stalls in which to display
goods. If they had a monopoly in specified territory their
charges were often excessive. The obstruction of those coming
to market so as to deprive the market owner of his stallage and
the people of an unrestricted market in which to buy and sell,
was called forestalling and was unlawful, both at the common
law and under the statutes. At first the term seems to have been
applied merely to physical obstructions to the movement of goods
to the markets; but the term quickly acquired a much larger
significance.c Naturally the absence of outside competition af-
forded great opportunity for the cornering or manipulation of
local markets, particularly in seasons where there was a poor
crop, and such efforts, when the lower classes were living under
conditions of abject poverty, aroused bitter feeling. Early text
writers emphasized the illegality of such practices.-
The oldest records of English laws show repeated efforts of
the authorities to regulate practices designed to affect prices.
During the reign of Henry III, prices of corn rose to the unheard
of price of £1, 4s. per quarter (8 bushels) ; prices of necessities
fluctuated excessively; and many people died of starvation., An
ancient chronicler alleges that in 1263 one hundred thousand poor
people attended the feast of St. Edward at Westminster2 Con-
ditions became so bad that in 12f6. a law known a. the "statute
of the pillory and tumbrel and of the assiie of bread and ale, and
against forestallers" ,0 was enacted. This statute, in addition
-Bracton, f. 235 b.
Coke, loc. cit. mtpra note 2.
0 Illingwvorth, Forestalling (1800) 10, 11.
7'4 Bacon, Abridgment (Bouvier's ed. 1844) 335; Hawins, Pleag of tfic
Crom, chap. 80.
S Illingworth, op. cit. svpra note 6, at 26.
9 Patent Rolls (1258-1266) 282.
10 (1266) 51 Hen. III, stat. 6.
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to fixing prices of various commodities, directed the leets,-
which were the local criminal courts,-to inquire as to forestall-
ers, defining them as those "that buy anything before the due
hour, or that pass out of towns to meet such things as come to
the markets, to the intent they may sell the same in the town
to regraters," and to punish transgressors in the town pillory.
No doubt there were numerous local prosecutions under such a
law, despite the fact that the power of the King was not then
firmly established. It was at this time,-the reign of Edward I,
-that national regulation of industry really began, although in
an ineffective way. Several years after the passage of this law,
one Wm. de Brewye, evidently a man of powerful local influence,
was brought before the King and his court and fined for for-
bidding the men of the town of Shoreham to sell provisions to
certain parties or to admit them to make purchases or sales in
the town."
In 1306, another law was enacted 12 which provided that-
"No forestaller shall be suffered to dwell in any town, who
manifestly is an oppressor of the poor, and a public enemy of
the country, who meeting grain, fish, herring, or other things
coming by land or by water to be sold, doth hasten to buy them
before another; thirsting after wicked gain, oppressing the poor,
and deceiving the rich; and by that means goeth about to sell the
said things much dearer than he that brought them; who cometh
about merchant strangers that bring merchandize, offering them
help in the sale of their wares, and informing them that they
may sell their wares, and that they meant to have done, and by
such craft and subtility deceiveth a whole town and a country."
The punishment for the first offense was forfeiture of the goods,
for the second, the pillory, for the third, imprisonment and fine,
and for the fourth, banishment.
An old writer- indicates how bitter popular sentiment was
toward those who attempted to manipulate the market. He says:
"Forestallers, ingrossers, and regraters, deserve to be reckoned
amongst the number of oppressors of the common good and pub-
lic weal of the realm, for they do endeavour to enrich themselves
by the impoverishment of others, and respect not how many do
lose, so they may gain. They have been exclaimed upon and con-
demned in parliament from one generation to another, as ap-
peareth by the statutes * * * but amongst others, especially
by the statute 34 Edw. I, it was ordained that no forestaller should
be suffered to dwell in any town; for he is a manifest oppressor
of the poor and a decayer of the rich, a public enemy of the
country, a canker, a moth, and a gnawing worm, that daily
wasteth the commonwealth; and the act and name of a forestaller
was so odious in that time, that it was moved in parliament to
have had it established by law, that a forestaller should be baited
11 (1274) Mich. Term Y. B. 2 & 3 Edw. I.
12 (1306) 34 Edw. I, stat. 5.
13 Pulton, Do Pace Regis (1615) tit. Oppression.
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out of the town 'where he dwelt by dogs, and whipped forth with
whips.'"
Living conditions of the people at this time must have been de-
plorable. An old English writer, probably prone to exaggerate,
describing conditions in 1314 says:
"notwithstanding the statutes of the last Parliament, the Kings
Writtes, &c., all things were sold dearer than before, no fleshe
coulde be had, Capons and Geese could not be found, Egs were
hard to come by, Sheepe died of the rot, Swine were out of the
way; a quarter of wheat, beanes and pease were sold for 20
shillings, a quarter of Malte for a mark, a quarter of Salt for 35
shillings." The following year "Horse flesh was counted great
delicates; the poore stole fatte dogs to eate; some (as it was saide)
compelled through famine, in hidde places, did eate the flesh of
their owne Children and some stole others which they devoured.
Theeves that were in prisons did plucke in pieces those that were
newly brought amongst them and greedily devoured them half
alive." '4
During this period as well as in previous years the government
was compelled to fix prices. In 1314 on complaint of the college
authorities at Oxford, the King fixed the prices of some neces-
sities in that market.25 In 1330, a law1 was passed prohibiting
the sale of wines except at a reasonable price, taking into account
their cost, and transportation expenses.
In 1348, there swept over England the terrible pestilence,
known as the Black Death, which wiped out nearly half the popu-
lation and wrecked the economic life of the country. Live stock
likewise died in huge numbers. While prices fell to low levels
in 1348, the tremendous shortage of laborers in following years,
and the dearth of agricultural production immediately following,
forced a great increase in prices. 17 One ancient writer states
that "what was worth a penny was now worth four or five times
as much." 18 In 1349, during this plague, as it was impossible to
get the members of parliament to meet, a regulation'" was adopted
by a group of peers, bishops and leading men of the kingdom,
which, in addition to making labor compulsory and fixing the
wages of laborers, prohibited sales of victuals except at reason-
able prices. The following year a statute was enacted : ° provid-
ing that forestallers on conviction should forfeit the forestalled
goods. A little later a law was passed making the forestalling of
merchandise coming into a kingdom punishable by death.2
14 Stowe, Annals, cited in 1 Cunningham, Growth of English Indtstry and
Commerce (5th ed. 1910) 388.
Irflhingworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 31.
16 (1330) 4 Edw. III c. 12.
27 Ashley, Edward III and his Wars (1887) 123, 126.
is 2 Chronicon Knighton (Lumby's ed. 1889) 65.
: (1349) 23 Edw. III c. 6; Illingworth, op. cit. -upra note 6, at 32, 34.
20 (1350) 25 Edw. III, stat. 4, c. 3.
21 (1353) 27 Edw. III, stat. 2, c. 11.
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In fixing reasonable prices the local magistrates were instructed
to consider such factors as the price in adjoining places, the first
cost of the goods, and the actual cost of transportation.2 -
This statute and subsequent ones prescribing reasonable prices
were in accordance with the teachings of the Church which held
avarice and unreasonable profits to be a deadly sin.23 Ex-com-
munication, invalidation of wills and other penalties were en-
forced by the Church against those who exacted exorbitant prices
or practiced usury. The Ayenite of Inwyt, a manual for con-
fessors, published in 1340 and widely circulated in England lays
down these rules as to the evils of trade:
"The eighth bough of Avarice is chaffering, wherein one sin-
neth in many ways, for worldly winning, and, namely, in seven
manners. The first is to sell the things as dear as one may, and
to buy as good cheap as one may. The next is lying, swearing,
and foreswearing, the higher to sell their wares. The third man-
ner is by weights and measures and that may be in three ways.
The first when one hath divers measures, and buyeth by the great-
est weights or the greatest measures and selleth by the least.
The other manner is when one hath rightful weights and rightful
measures to sell untruly, as do the taverners that fill the measure
with scum. The third manner is when these that sell by weight
contrive that the thing that they weigh showeth more heavy.
The fourth manner to sin in chaffering is to sell to time. Of this
we have spoken above. The fifth manner is to sell otherwise
than one hath showed before; as doth these scriveners that show-
eth good letter at beginning and after do badly. The sixth is to
hide the truth ab6ut the thing that one will sell, as do the dealers
of horses. The seventh is to contrive that the thing one selleth
maketh for to show better than it is; as do the sellers of cloth that
choose dim places wherein to sell their cloth. In many other man-
ners one may sin in chafferings, but long time it were to say." 21
The law of the Church was studied in the law schools, and
judges and statesmen were trained in its principles. That these
principles should find expression in laws was inevitable.
The devastating effects of the pestilence were felt for years and
many towns fell into decay. The period of high prices resulting
from high wages and slack production, as well as the wars and de-
basement of money which took place in the reign of Edward III,
naturally evoked legislation.
In 1363, the House of Commons petitioned the King, alleging
that the forestalling and regrating of goods was causing exor-
bitant prices, and as a result the King issued a proclamation that
the existing statutes should be put into effect and appointed a
commission of inquiry. 25 In 1370 one Nicholas Sardouch, a
merchant of Lombardy, on petition of "the poor women called
22 1 Ashley, English Economic History (1893) 385.
23 Ibid. Chap. VI.
24 See Ashley, op. cit. supra note 17, at 70, 71.
25 Illingworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 41.
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Silkewemen," was indicted at the common law for forestalling
and regrating both raw and spun silk with the intent to raise
prices. On trial by a jury of six natives and six foreigners, he
was found guilty and fined £200 which in those days was an
enormous sum.20  Even the making of false statements designed
to affect prices was unlawful. The engrossing of a commodity
with an intent to sell it at an unreasonable price, was likewise
held to be indictable at common law.27 Similarly the engrossing
of a commodity, such as malt, hops, or fish, and the sale thereof
at an unreasonable price was held an offense at common law.3
This was a period of very heavy taxation because of the wars wifh
France, and no doubt war brought considerable disruption of
trade. Farm laborers were in a state of insurrection and the
constant riots show the living conditions of the masses of people
were very bad.2' In 1389 another law 0 was enacted, providing
that "Victuallers shall have reasonable gains, according to the
discretion of the justices [of the peace]." This act express!y
provided that punishment should be bodily and that the statute
of 23 Edw. III c. 6 should be put in execution.
To us in these modern times, it is difficult to sense the living
conditions of those times. The fifteenth century was one of
pestilence and famine. There were twenty outbreaks of plague
during this one century. "The undrained neglected soil; the
shallow stagnant waters which lay upon the surface of the
ground, the narrow unhealthy homes of all classes of the people;
the filthy neglected streets of the towns, the insufficient and un-
wholesome food; the abundance of stale fish which was eaten;
the scanty variety of the vegetables which were consumed * -*
predisposed the agricultural and town population alihe to ty-
phoidal diseases and left them little chance of recovery when
stricken down with pestilence." "i
During the forepart of this century, there seem to have been
some efforts made to prevent monopolistic practices. In 1411,
the 12th year of the reign of King Henry IV, a special commis-
sion was directed to inquire and certify for prosecution all fore-
stallers and regraters of corn. As a result the records show a
number of men were indicted, although the final disposition of
their cases does not appear. Such practices as buying in large
quantities and selling at greatly increased prices, exporting to
foreign countries, hoarding and r~fusing to sell except at ex-
2GEdw. III, Roll 19, cited in Illingworth, op. cit. supr- note 0, at 235.
27 See The King v. Maynard (1631) Croke Car. 231; 43 Edw, III, Roll 19,
cited in Illingworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 235.
28 Roy v. Davies (1615) 1 Rolle, *11; Anon . (1649) Style, *192.
29 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 392.
20 (1389) 13 Rich. II, stat. 1, c. S.
31 Denton, England in the Fifteenth Century (1888) 103.
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cessive prices, were termed forestalling under these indictments."
It appears that frequent commissions were issued to locate and
prosecute those guilty of forestalling or regrating. But -there
was no law enacted for many years regulating business competi-
tion. The towns where business had once flourished still felt
the blight of the great plague. Portions of them had fallen into
ruin. During the latter part of the century, Henry VII im-
posed such heavy taxes and duties that trade decreased. Wars,
too, took their toll from industry. 
3
I"n-532.iParliament enacted a law fixing the prices of meat."
That this was a period of excessive prices is evidenced by the
King's proclamation of this same year wherein it was stated that
because of the great scarcity and high prices, and in order to
prevent engrossing and regrating, the King's Council, or any
seven of its members, should have the power to fix reasonable
prices of all victuals necessary for man's sustenance, and provid-
ing for the forfeiture of goods sold at any other prices.' Eight
years later both these laws were repealed.30 During this same
period, the woolen industry was becoming national in its organ-
ization and operation, but owing to the hostility of the weavers
toward middlemen who purchased quantities of wool to meet the
demands of large employers and exporters, Henry VIII tried to
force trade back into purely local channels by the enactment of
a law designed in part to prevent the engrossing of the commodity
by middlemen.3 7
In the latter part of the fifteenth century, the town govern-
ments established a regular practice of purchasing corn in times
of scarcity and retailing it at a reasonable price. Corn was im-
ported from the continent and in this way the poor were better
protected from the exactions of forestallers. Thus we read how
the mayor of Bristol in 1522 when "whete, corn, and other gray-
nes rose at a dire price" bought up large supplies so that the
"inhabitauntes of the towne were greatly releved and comforted
in mynysshing of the price of whete, corn, and other graynys
sold in the open market." 38
The poor laws adopted during this period show there were
many unemployed and poverty was rampant.30 Legislative ef-
forts were made to correct the situation, among them being the
Weavers Act which among other things prohibited the ingross-
32 Illingworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 239.
as 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 506.
31 (1532) 24 Henry VIII c. 3.
sr (1533) 25 Henry VIII c. 1, 2.
- (1541) 33 Henry VIII c. 1.
37 (1545) 37 Henry VIII c. 15.
38 2 Ashley, op. cit. supra note 22, at 33, 37.
so 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 539.
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ing of looms, and the renting of them at unreasonable rates.42
In 1548 a law was passed-, prohibiting victuallers from conspir-
ing to fix prices. For the first offense, the transgressor was to pay
a fine of £10, or if such fine was not paid within six days, he was
to suffer twenty days imprisonment on bread and water; for the
second offense, he was fined £20 and for default in payment was
compelled to stand in the pillory, and for the third offense, he
was to be fined £40 and for default in payment was to stand in
the pillory and lose one of his ears. This act was subsequently
confirmed in 1670 by 22 & 23 Car. II c. 19.
In 1549, laws were enacted providing that no cattle should be
bought except in open market, and prohibiting the buying of
butter or cheese for resale except by retail in open shop market
or fair.4- These statutes during this period seem to have been
the result of very high prices existing during this time. In this
same year, 1549, the King, on advice of the King's council, fixed
prices of provisions under the old statute enacted during the
reign of Hen. VIII23 The following year the King prohibited
the export of corn except at fixed prices, and authorized the
justices of the peace in every county to inspect farmers' granaries,
and after a jury had fixed the amount required by the owner for
his own needs, to order the surplus brought to the next adjoin-
ing market. Fine and imprisonment were provided; but high
prices still continued "by reason of conveyance of commodities
beyond sea, and partly by men's buying up of corn in the markets
to be sold again; and also by not bringing any quantities to the
market," and the King issued yet another proclamation, dated
September 24th, outlining in the preamble how the "infamous
greediness of divers ill-natured people, neither minding the due
obedience of good laws, nor any preservation of natural societies
within their own country, and contrary to the provision of divers
good laws and statutes, by frequent unlawful exportation of
victuals, and by many detestible frauds and covins, had occasioned
great scarcity and unreasonable prices of victuals," and therefore
forbade exportation of grain except at certain fixed prices, pro-
hibited the buying of various grains in the open market for resale
and even provided for the forfeiture of goods, chattels, leases, and
farms of farmers who evaded the law. But notwithstanding
this "there came but little corn to the markets" and on the 20th
of October the King, acting under the authority of the old stat-
ute,41 fixed the price of corn." 4-
40 (1555) 2 & 3 Phil. & Af. c. 11.
42 (1548) 2 & 3 Edw. VI c. 15.
42 (1549) 3 & 4 Edw. VI, c. 19; c. 21.
43 See flingworth, op. cit. supra, note 6, at 60; 2 Strypes, Eededical
Memorials (1721) 151.
4 (1533) 25 Hen. VIII c. 1, 2.
4z; 2 Strypes, op. cit. supra note 43, at 222.
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In this same year, 1550, was enacted the principal statute
against forestalling, engrossing and regrating. This statute4 a
defines and prohibits forestalling, engrossing'and regrating. It
was unanimously passed by parliament.
4 7
Forestalling was defined as follows:
"That whatsoever person or persons shall buy or
cause to be bought, any merchandise, victual, or any other thing
whatsoever, coming by land or by water toward any market or
fair, to be sold in the same * * * or make any bargain,
contract, or promise, for the having or buying of the same, or
any part thereof, so coming as is aforesaid, before the said mer-
chandise, victuals, or other things, shall be in the market,
* * * ready to be sold; or shall make any motion by word,
letter, message, or otherwise, to any person or persons, for the
enhancing of the price, or dearer selling of any thing or things
above-mentioned, or else dissuade, move, or stir, any person or
persons coming to the market * .... to. abstain or forbear
to bring, or convey, any of the things above rehearsed, to any
market * * * shall be deemed * for a forestaller.",
Regrating was defined as follows:
"That whatsoever person or persons shall by any
means regrate, obtain, or get into his or their hands or possession,
in a fair or market, any corn, or other commodities, that shall be
brought to any fair or market within this realm 0 * *1 to,
be sold, and do sell the same again in any fair or market holden
or kept in the same place, or in any other fair or market within
four miles thereof, shall be * * * taken for a regrater."
Engrossing was defined as follows:
"That whatsover person or persons * * 0 shall engross or
get into his or their hands, by buying, contracting, or promise-
taking, other than by demise, grant, or lease of land or title, any-
corn growing in the fields, or any other corn or grain, butter,
cheese, fish or other dead victuals whatsoever, within the realm
of England, to the intent to sell the same again, shall be accepted,
reputed, and taken an unlawful engrosser."
For the first offense punishment of two months and forfeiture
of the goods bought was provided; for the second offense im-
prisonment for six months and loss of double the value of the
goods so bought was specified; for the third offense the culprit
was to be placed in the pillory, forfeit all of his goods, be com-
mitted to prison and to remain there during the King's pleasure.
Various exceptions were made to the act. Parties could buy
grains for conversion into food in their own homes, or tradesmen
could buy such necessities for use in their trade, if resold at retail
and-at reasonable prices. Innkeepers could buy grains for use
in their establishments, or for resale at retail, if sold at reason-
able prices, and various other similar. exceptions were made, the
obvious purpose of the act being to prevent any manipulations of
46 (1552) 5 & 6 Edw. VI c. 14.
47 See Illingworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 67.
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the market to control or enhance prices. During the next sev-
eral years, several statutes were passed against these and similar
practices.4 There were also numerous town ordinances adopted
prohibiting forestalling-1
While wars, the debasement of the coinage, and the decay of
agriculture due to the shift to sheep grazing were no doubt the
chief factors bringing about high prices during this period there
was a general feeling at the time that they were due to combina-
tions in restraint of trade. The very poor methods of transport
of course made it very easy to secure a "corner" in local markets
and probably numerous instances of this sort furnished apparent
proof that they were the cause of the general high level of prices.
A proclamation issued by the King in 1551 complains of the
scarcity of provisions.
Twelve years later in 1562 during the reign of Queen Elizabeth,
a law was passed which, after stating the inconvenience to the
public from the great number of drovers of cattle and badgers of
corn and other victuals, whose activities enhanced prices, pro-
vided that such persons must be licensed in open sessions of the
peace; that such persons must have dwelt in their localities three
years; must be married men, householders, at least thirty years
of age, and that such license should be granted only for one year,
and provided that they should give bond with surety that they
would not forestall or engross commodities in violation of the
law.5o This law and many local regulations were devised to pre-
vent the monopolization of local supplies, particularly of corn, so
as to protect the poor consumer. In some localities, dealers could
not buy until the poor had made their purchases.
That this condition continued is indicated by the proclamation
of Queen Elizabeth in 1586, wherein she speaks of the dearth of
food, and the "covetousness of many engrossers of corn" and
threatened to severely punish offenders who violated the statute
enacted in the reign of her father, Henry the Eighth, which pro-
hibited the charging of unreasonable prices.01 By the middle of
the following year, the Queen again issued a proclamation con-
demning engrossers and others who "do pretend to raise the prices
by colour of the unreasonableness of this Summer" to the "Griefe
of her poorer sort of people" and who of "meere covetousness
have very lately even within two months, most uncharitably
haunced up their prices, not tollerable to be suffered." -  The
justices were ordered to take such action as would reduce prices.
-1 (1552) 5 & 6 Edw. VI c. 15; (1554) 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 7.
49 (1552) Lipson, op. cit. svpra note 1, at 272.
5o (1562) 5 Eliz. c. 12.
51 Dyson, Proclamations of Queen Elizabcth (1618) 241; ef. 2 Cunning-
ham, Growtk of Evglish History and Commercc (3d ed. 1903) 92.
5- 2 Cunningham (1912) op. cit. szipra note 14, at 93; Dyson, op. cit. upra
note 51, at 338.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
For a period of several years good crops brought low prices to con-
sumers but during the period between 1593 and 1597 there was
a great scarcity and the supply of food in many localities was
insufficient.3 There was also at this time intense popular feel-
ing against national monopolies which had been granted by the
Queen to court favorites. Beginning in 1604 several more stat-
utes were enacted dealing with forestalling and similar practices
as applied to particular commodities.5 4 That there was wide-
spread complaint against local monopolies of this character is
evidenced by the following statement in the journal of the House
of Commons in 1604 :5
"All the clothiers and in effect all the merchants of England com-
plained grievously of the engrossing and restraint of trade by the
rich merchants of London, as being to the undoing or great hin-
drance of all the rest."
In 1618 the government increased its control by a proclamation
vesting in the clerks of the markets broad powers of regulation.
These clerks were local officials who punished all market offences.
By this proclamation the clerks were directed to fix reasonable
prices of victuals and other provisions and "especially to inquire
of, and punish all Forestallers, Engrossers, and Regrators who
by their inordinate desire of gaine do enhance the prices of
all things vendible." " In 1622 the clothing trade, the great in-
dustry of the country, was stagnant and there was widespread
suffering and unemployment.57 Evidencing the serious conditions
existing at the time was the proclamation of the King, issued in
1623. By the proclamation the King, observing that in times of
scarcity the poorer classes were in great want of provisions, and
that in times of plenty farmers by the low prices and lack of
demand for their corn were unable to support their expenses,
established public magazines and empowered merchants to erect
storehouses for storing English corn which they might buy in
such quantities as they saw fit whenever certain specified grains
sold below the prices named in such proclamation. For many
years the larger cities had been compelled to import quantities of
corn from the continent and store it for the protection of the
poor in times of scarcity.58 The prohibition of forestalling and
regrating, discouraging as it did the wholesaling of goods, made
such action well nigh essential. That there was a great deal of
local cornering of supplies is indicated by a seventeenth century
53 2 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 101.
- (1604) 2 Jac. I, c. 22, sec. 7; (1605) 3 Jac. I, c. 9, sec. 3.
55 (1604) 1 THE JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE op ConrIONS, 218.
56 2 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 52, at 94.
57 Ibid. 507, 233.
.8 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 273.
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writer who complains that in his time "these monopolists began
to swarm like the frogs of Egypt." 05
Because of the high prices prevailing at this time, Charles the
First was compelled to issue proclamations in 1630 regulating
the prices of certain foods, and again in 1633 the King issued a
proclamation regulating the prices of rabbits, butter, poultry,
candles, fuel and some other commodities."C From this period
on to 1700, there were several statutes enacted bearing upon
marketing methods."'
During the reigns of Elizabeth and Charles I, the regulation
of trade had been under the administrative control of the Privy
Council. The flexibility of the system made it react quickly to
changing conditions and there seems to have been a sincere effort
to protect the poor consumer, who lived under conditions of
desperate poverty, against local monopolies and restraints of trade
in absolute necessities of life. But early in the eighteenth cen-
tury, Parliament secured control of the government. A legis-
lative body acts slowly and can deal effectively only by the adop-
tion of general measures. Bribery by business organizations
seeking special privileges was not unknown in the House of Com-
mons. 2 At the same time various factors contributed to the
establishment of prosperity in the country. Foreign trade was
developing rapidly. The establishment of the Bank of England
popularized paper money, organized the capital of the nation,
made it available in trade, greatly widened the use of credit, and
thus stimulated business in all its forms.0 3 The increase of trade
of course increased the demand for labor. For the first half of
this century there was no legislation, and probably no need for
it since the laws then in existence seem to have been but little
invoked. In 1757, however, there was a great scarcity of food
and prices were fixed for bread, oatmeal and other cereals.c" In
1766, the prices of necessities were so high that there were up-
risings among the poorer classes of people. Corn was seized,
flour mills destroyed and as a result a proclamation was issued
in September of that year stating the laws against forestalling
were still in effect.2' From 1765 to 1774 the weather was bad
and crops poor, and for some years thereafter the seasons were
very irregular, thus producing great fluctuations in prices, which
59 Hearnshaw, Leet Jurisdction (1908) 114; see Lipson, loc. cit. aupre
note 58.
co Illingworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 80.
61 Scobell, Acts of Parlianent (1658) Part II, 142; (1663) 15 Car. II c. 7,
sec. 4; ibid, c. 8; (1670) 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 19; (1700) 11 & 12 Will. II,
c. 13, sec. 5.
622 Cunningham, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 404.
63 Ibid. 442.
64 (1758) 31 Geo. II c. 29.
6s Of. Girdler, Pernicious Consequwices of Foresta ng, Regrzting and
Engrossing (1800) 23.
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not only ruined small farmers but also induced widespread spec-
ulation66 Many complaints were at different times presented
to Parliament, alleging that existing high prices resulted from
forestalling and similar practices, which complaints were referred
to parliamentary committees for investigation. But the organ-
/ ization of trade had long since progressed far beyond the simple
trade and barter of the markets, fairs and towns. Business
was becoming organized on a national scale, and foreign trade
had come to be of great importance. Improved transportation
had freed local communities from the danger of local famines or
monopolies, and these laws designed to deal with conditions aris-
ing under the old organization of business were not only obsolete
but in fact hampered the free movement of goods, which would
make the supply fluid and equalize prices. Thus they tended to
create the very conditions they were designed to prevent. Adam
Smith in his great book, The Wealth of Natiort, condemned
such laws in most vigorous language. "The popular fear of en-
grossing and forestalling" said he "may be compared to the pop-
ular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft." -- The Parliamentary
committee appointed to investigate the matter reported in the
following language:
"1. That it is the opinion of this committee that the several
laws relating to badgers, ingrossers, forestallers, and regrators,
by preventing the circulation of, and free trade in corn and other
provisions, have been the means of raising the price thereof in
many parts of this kingdom.
2. That it is the opinion of this committee that the house be
moved to bring in a bill to remedy the evils occasioned by the
said laws." 08
No action was taken for several years. Further complaints
were made to Parliament from different sections of the country,
urging a better regulation of the markets; but after further in-
vestigation the committee made a report urging a repeal of these
laws; and in 1772 a statute was enacted intended to repeal these
various statutes. Probably through defective draftsmanship a
number of these laws were not included in this repeal.
This law which recognizes the tendency of the previous restric-
tions in fact to restrain trade, reads as follows:
"Whereas it hath been found by experience, that the restraints
laid by several statutes upon the dealing in corn, meal, flour,
cattle, and sundry other sorts of victuals, by preventing a free
trade in the said commodities, have a tendency to discourage the
growth and to enhance the price of the same; which statutes, if
put in execution, would bring great distress upon the inhabitants
of many parts of this kingdom, and in particular upon those of
66 Cf. Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 560.
67 2 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations (1776) Book iv, ch. iv.
68 Illingworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 89.
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the cities of London and Westminister; be it therefore en-
acted. . . . That the act of 3 & 4 Edw. VI. c. 21, concern-
ing butter and cheese; the 5 & 6 Edw. VI c. 14 against regrators,
forestallers, and ingrossers; 3 Ph. & Mary, c. 3, respecting milch
kind, etc.; 5 Eliz. c. 12 touching badgers of corn, and drovers of
cattle to be licensed; 15 Car. II. c. 8, to prevent selling of live fat
cattle by butchers and so much of the stat. 5 Anne, c. 34, as relates
to butchers selling cattle alive or dead in London and Westmin-
ister or within ten miles thereof; and all acts made for the better
enforcement of the same being detrimental to the supply of the
labouring and manufacturing poor of this kingdom, shall be and
the same are hereby declared to be repealed." 1-
Thus the term forestalling, as years passed by, acquired a very
broad meaning. Illingworth, an English lawyer who made a
thorough investigation of the law in 1800, defined it as follows:
"Forestalling, commonly speaking, means, to market before the
_public, or, to anticipate or prevent the public market; but, legally
understood, it has a greater signification, for it comprehends all
unlawful endeavours to enhance the price of any commodity, and
all practices which have an apparent tendency thereto, such as,
spreading false rumours; buying commodities in the market be-
fore the accustomed hour; buying and selling again the same
-articles in the same market; and other such criminal devices.
It also comprehended the offences of regrating and ingrossing;
but the names regrator and ingrosser were not known before the
reign of Hen. III. 3 Inst. 195, 196-1 Hawk. P. Cor. c. SO-Brown
Indict. 40-Cromp. p. 80 b. No attempt of this kdnd can be
looked upon in any other light than as an offence against the
public, as it apparently tends to put a check upon trade to the
general inconvenience of the people, by putting it out of their
power to supply themselves with any commodity, unless at an un-
reasonable expense; which often proves extremely oppressive to
the poorer sort, and cannot but give just cause of complaint even
to the richest. Hawkins, P. C. 234.-1
Iost of these laws dealt with farm products, and were designed
to protect consumers but their enforcement by preventing free-
dom of distribution has often created a shortage in one locality
and an oversupply in another. Their repeal therefore was wise.
Both the public and the courts, however, remained opposed to
monopoly and the manipulation of the market, and in 1800 it was
held that the common law was still in force against such offences
as forestalling and engrossing.7 In this case the spreading of
false rumors that there would be a shortage of the crop of hops,
for the purpose of inducing growers to withhold their supply
from the market and thus enhance prices, was declared unlawful.
Thus for five centuries the English people struggled against
local monopolies and practices restraining trade primarily in the
-, (1772) 12 Geo. III c. 71.
70 Illingworth, op. cit. zwpra note 6, at 14; cee also Burn-,, Jzmtcc (11th
ed. 1769) 195.
71 The King v. Waddington (1801) 1 East, 013,, 148.
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products of the farm until they built up a substantial body of
prohibitions. But most of these rules were designed for a sys-
tem of trade based upon the limited, localized trade of the towns
and markets, while commerce even in farm products had become
national in its operation. As the forces of competition became
unleashed by improvements in transportation, credit and bank-
ing, and fostered by the security of person and property guaran-
teed by a strong government, the danger of local monopolies was
largely removed and these preventive measures directed at them
became largely obsolete and in fact restrictive of competition.
Price fixing, licensing systems, and even extremely severe penal-
ties failed to prevent the irresistible development of industry and
trade on a national rather than a local basis. The power of the
common law however to reach harmful monopolies or efforts to
control the larger markets remained unimpaired.
AGREEMENTS TO REFRAIN FROM PRACTICING A TRADE
Another class of restraints given considerable attention by the
common law courts in mediaeval times was that involved in
agreements with reference to the practices of one's trade. The
production of manufactured goods was entirely by skilled artisans
and their apprentices, who were organized in gilds in the towns.
As there were many regulations restricting a man's right to enter
a trade, to move from his own town, or to engage 'in any trade
but his own, any agreement made by him not to practice his own
trade became of real importance to his community, for such an
agreement might have the effect of making him and his family
a charge upon the community as well as depriving the community
of the benefit of his competition. In 1415, in a suit brought on
a bond entered into by a dyer that he would not engage in his
trade, the bond was held unlawful and the judge vociferously ex-
claims, "By God! if the plaintiff were here, he should go to prison,
till he paid a fine to the king." 72
The reasons why agreements in restraint of trade were held
illegal at common law is stated by an early Massachusetts court
in the following language:
"The unreasonableness of contracts in restraint of trade and
business, is very apparent from several obvious considerations.
1. Such contracts injure the parties making them, because they
diminish their means of procuring livelihoods and a competency
for their families. They tempt improvident persons, for the sake
of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power to make future
acquisitions. And they expose such person to imposition and
oppression. 2. They tend to deprive the public of the services
of men in the employments and capacities in which they may be
most useful to the community as well as themselves. 3. They
discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish the products of
72 Case of John the Dyer Y. B. (1414) 2 Hen. V, 5, p]. 26.
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ingenuity and skill. 4. They prevent competition and enhance
prices. 5. They expose the public to all the evils of monoply." -
But as business developed and the value of good will became
understood, as individual freedom of movement and action was
secured, and as corporations became factors in trade and com-
merce, the courts began to relax their position and to determine
from the particular facts of each case whether the restraint was
in fact unreasonable.
Judge Taft has described the development of the law in this
respect in the following succinct language:
"The inhibition against restraints of trade at common law
seems at first to have had no exception. See language of Justice
Hull, Year Book, 2 Hen. V., folio 5, pl. 26. After a time it be-
came apparent to the people and the courts that it was in the
interests of trade that certain covenants in restraint of trade
should be enforced. It was of importance as an incentive to
industry and honest dealing in trade, that, after a man had built
up a business with an extensive good will, he should be able to
sell his business and good will to the best advantage, and he
could not do so unless he could bind himself by an enforceable
contract not to engage in the same business in such a way as to
prevent injury to that which he was about to sell. It was equally
for the good of the public and trade, when partners dissolved,
and one took the business, or they divided the business, that each
partner might bind himself not to do anything in trade there-
after which would derogate from his grant of the interest con-
veyed to his former partner. Again, when two men became
partners in a business, although their union might reduce com-
petition, this effect was only an incident to the main purpose of
a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a
successful business, and one useful to the community. Restric-
tions in the articles of partnership upon the business activity of
the members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the
common enterprise, were, of course, only ancillary to the main
end of the union, and were to be encouraged. Again, when one
in business sold property with which the buyer might set up a
rival business, it was certainly reasonable that the seller should
be able to restrain the buyer from doing him an injury which,
but for the sale, the buyer would be unable to inflict. This was
not reducing competition, but was only securing the seller against
an increase of competition of his own creating. Such an e:cep-
tion was necessary to promote the free purchase and sale of prop-
erty. Again, it was of importance that business men and pro-
fessional men should have every motive to employ the ablest
assistants, and to instruct them thoroughly; but they would
naturally be reluctant to do so unless such assistants were able
to bind themselves not to set up a rival business in the vicinity
after learning the details and secrets of the business of their
employers." -I
7 Alger v. Thacler (1837, 'Mass.) 19 Pick. 51, 54.
74 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. (1S98, C. C. A. 6th) 85




In early mediaeval England, the town and village were the
centers of business life. Trade was local rather than national
and there were in fact comparatively few towns. At the time of
the Norman Conquest there were only eighty towns in England
and the total town population was probably not over one hundred
fifty thousand. 75 In the absence of national regulation, some sort
of organization was necessary to regulate the conduct of trade
within the towns. As early as the eleventh century we find rec-
ords of charters granted to so-called merchant gilds. 0 The mer-
chant gilds were organizations of traders to whose members were
granted by the Crown the exclusive right to buy and sell com-
modities other than food either at wholesale or at retail without
payment of customs or tolls within the town or territory covered
by the charter given to them.77 For example in the charter to
the gild at Oxford it is provided that "none who is not of the gild
shall do any traffic in the city or suburbs." 78 They were thus
given a commercial monopoly within their particular territory.
In most towns this monopoly was not exercised fully because such
a policy was contrary to the selfish interests of gild members, and
non-members were therefore permitted to buy and sell at whole-
sale provided they paid toll and sold only to members of the gild,
and did not buy a few specified commodities of which there was
no surplus.79 But the most strenuous efforts were made to pre-
vent retail competition by foreigners and these were for a long
time successful.80 The gild had elective officers, adopted regula-
tions, possessed a court and provided the machinery for the reg-
ulation of the trade controlled by it. As its membership included
many of the burgesses, who possessed the voting power, it often
exercised a large control over the policies of the municipal govern-
ments which tended strongly to protect its monopolistic privileges.
In their early development the merchant gilds served a most
useful purpose. The national government was weak. It could
not effectually regulate trade and the constant wars increased
its need for revenue. An organization such as the gild afforded
a means for regulation and a source of revenue, for such organ-
izations had to purchase their privileges from the King or the
lord of their locality outright or by the annual payment of money
or both. And they did not buy such rights cheaply from high
living, ambitious monarchs. While in fact monopolies, they did
7 1 Ashley, op. cit. supra note 22, at 63.
TO Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 240.
77 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 219.
781 Riley, Liber Custumarun (1860) 671; Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 241.
-0 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 241.
80 1 Cunningham, op. cit. siupra note 14, at 249.
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not at first show the evil tendencies of monopolies, for the finan-
cial burdens placed upon them made them anxious to secure every
trader in their membership. But membership carried with it
very valuable privileges. In most gilds each member was re-
quired to share his bargains with other members present when
the purchase was made. This so-called right of "lot" of course
forced the more skillful buyers to share the benefits of their skill
with other members, and naturally largely eliminated competi-
tion in bidding with results probably not entirely pleasant to the
seller. The officers of the gild likewise made purchases for their
members, known as "common bargains." 8, An outsider bring-
ing a quantity of merchandise for sale would be compelled to
deal with such officers if at all. In this way he was denied the
benefit of this bidding competition and the members secured the
goods at advantageous prices. Members were aided by the gild
in time of adversity. Arbitration of all disputes between mem-
bers was compelled.r2  When his business took him to other tovns
he had behind him the prestige of his gild to protect his person
and property against unreasonable action1 3 From the public
standpoint, the gilds performed an invaluable service by main-
taining high standards of quality and workmanship which for
many years were rigorously enforced. In the middle ages when
religious teaching made it wicked to charge an unreasonable price
it is probable the gilds did not at first abuse this power to fix
prices. In fact their membership was so diversified that differ-
ing interests did not make them the most effective agencies for
fixing high prices.
But during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the gilds fell
into decay and gradually became a negligible factor in the eco-
nomic life of the country. Various causes contributed to this
result. Their monoply of trade within their own town and their
rigorous efforts to protect it forced trade away and undermined
their prosperity. Again the towns in which the gilds were
located depended to a great extent upon trade from contiguous
territory, and they were thus compelled to meet the competition
of the fairs and markets which attracted the same buyers and
sellers. Likewise the policy of the Crown in granting, for suf-
ficient compensation, immunity to tolls to the inhabitants of dif-
ferent towns, ecclesiastical orders and others, tended to break
down the monopoly of town trade held by the gilds, and to develop
more widespread commercial intercourse throughout the nation:
The compelling necessities of trade, if business were to develop,
forced the adoption of inter-municipal treaties giving reciprocal
s5 Ibid. 245; 2 Ashley, op. cit. supra note 22, Part II, 39.
6 2 Gross, Gild Mfcrclia t (1890) 65.
S Lipson, op. cit. su'pra note 1, at 246.
1 Gross, op. cit. supra note 82, at 52.
s Lipson, op. cit. szpura note 1, at 256.
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rights of exemption from tolls to the burghers of the towns parties
to them who came to trade, and thus led to greater freedom."
Similarly they were gradually forced to meet foreign competition.
When controlling the city governments, the gilds procured ordi-
nances requiring foreign merchants to buy only from their mem-
bers and to sell solely to them, to deal only at wholesale, to remain
in the country only a short period, and in various other ways re-
stricting them. But the great lords who %vanted to sell their
agricultural products direct to the foreigners and to buy direct
from them, after a long period of opposition finally procured the
removal of such restrictions from a sympathetic King who saw
in the foreign merchants an additional source of revenue."
These foreign merchants, organized in powerful associations, be-
came very strong competitive factors in breaking down the
monopolies of the gilds. Such monopolies in a great distributing
center such as London early evoked hostile sentiment, for they
compelled every Englishman from the country who brought goods
for sale to foreign buyers, to make his sale through a London
merchant, or run the risk of forfeiting his goods. In 1405 public
feeling against such a curtailment of freedom to trade compelled
the enactment of a law permitting all merchants in London to
carry on wholesale dealings with any of the King's subjectss al-
though the retail monopoly was of course still retained.
Likewise it is evident the gilds lost popular support. In order
to evade their regulations and the heavy burden of taxation placed
upon them, tradesmen went into the country districts, or to new
towns, so that there grew up a large body of business men
unfriendly to them, and who could sell more cheaply because
they were freed from the burdens borne by a gild member. The
gild efforts to fix prices at excessive levels, and the methods em-
ployed to control them excited hostility. In an old English case
in 1397, a merchant complained that "because he sold his mer-
chandise at a less price than other merchants of the town of
Yaxley did there * * * they assaulted him, beat him and
ill-treated him and left him there for dead, so that he despaired
of his life." Il As the common people made their demands felt,
the municipal governments acquired partial control over the gilds.
The old records show the great difficulty encountered in holding
down prices. Often the officials were bribed. Often they were
themselves members of the gild. In fact it may be said that
the officials of the towns were almost entirely members of the
gild, their gild hall being often used as the town hall.o That the
86 2 Ashley, op. cit. supra note 22, at 44.
87 Ibid. Part I, 105; Part II, 13.
88 (1405) 7 Henry IV, c. 9; 1 Ashley, op. cit. supra note 22, Part II, at
16.
89 Select Cases in Chancery (Selden Society, 1896) 28.
90 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 225.
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common people sometimes expressed their feelings plainly, is
evidenced by an old record which tells how in the city of Coventry
"the commons rose and threw loaves at the mayor's head in St.
Mlary's Hall, because the bakers kept not the assize, neither did
the mayor punish them according to his office." 0, The history
of the towns shows the efforts of some town officials, however, to
prevent the exaction of excessive prices. Such action could only
have resulted from the most vigorous demands of the masses of
people who lived under conditions of deplorable poverty. It is
not improbable also that as the national government became
strong, its comparative freedom from local influence in the ad-
ministration of regulations deprived the merchant gilds of much
of the benefit which would have otherwise accrued from their
control of the town governments and their monopoly of trade.
Another potent factor tending to destroy the merchant gilds
was the tendency of their members to withdraw and form more
specialized organizations devoted to the interests of a particular
trade or craft. The merchant gilds, like our modern chambers
of commerce, were composed of a most diversified membership12
As in the modern organizations so in the old, interests so often
clashed that their effectiveness was often seriously impaired. As
industry and trade developed, the interests of producers of com-
petitive products, of manufacturers and distributors, of employer
and artificer clashed and there rapidly developed the picturesque
organizations known as the craft gilds. The new organizations
were really modeled on the old, and their general development
was about a century subsequent to that of the merchant gilds.9
The old spirit of monopoly still prevailed, but each gild secured
control of the monopoly of its own particular trade or craft.
Parliament, moreover, by a law enacted in 1363 provided that
"artificers and men of mysteries shall each join the craft he may
choose between this time and the next Candlemas" and prescribed
a penalty of fine and imprisonment for failure so to do.91 So
there came into existence gilds of Armourers, Haberdashers,
Fishmongers, Goldsmiths, Tailors, Cappers, Cobblers, Pewterers,
Cordwainers, Bakers and what not. The old merchant gilds were
probably in large part organizations of merchants. The new
craft gilds were really in the main organizations of petty manu-
facturers. Later after a bitter fight they came under the control
of the municipal governments, and were as a general rule created
by the town authorities3 Often their monopolies were bought of
impecunious monarchs, and they customarily paid an annual sum
91 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 269.
92 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 344.
' 1 Ashley, op. cit. suepra note 22, at 76.
' Ibid. 95.
'5Lipson, op. cit. su:pra note 1, at 339; 1 Cunningham, op. cit. Lmpra note
14, at 337.
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either to the natioxial or municipal government for their monop-
olistic franchises. In the beginning, all persons practicing the
trade were required to become members, for the heavy price
paid for the monopoly required a large membership to carry its
burden. They were in fact quasi-governmental bodies exercis-
ing very important powers.98 They were required each year tD
put on costly plays and pageants, generally of a religious nature,
which ultimately became a severe drain on their financial re-
sources, but which expense was strongly urged as a justification
for their monopoly.97 They often supported altars and priests
in the local church. They contributed to the support of poor
members, even building almshouses "for the br~then of the livery
or clothing falling into poverty." 98 They often maintained schools.
But their main purpose was of course to control their trade and
in the regulation of business when trade was localized and national
government weak, they performed an invaluable service. The
gilds thus regulated the quality of the product and inflicted penal-
ties for inferior workmanship, and fraudulent trading.,, They
established rules for apprenticeship to assure a supply of expert
workmen. They adopted rules against unfair competition by one
member .against another and for "the abating of all guiles and
trickery." 100 They maintained a compulsory system of arbitra-
tion of disputes between their members. Their control over their
members was so strict that in some cities they could fine, place
in'the stocks or imprison members for violation of their rules.
They regulated wages. It seems probable, too, that at first, in
response to the religious teachings of the times, they fixed prices
on a reasonable, fair basis. But as time passes their methods
changed. There are records of court proceedings against gilds
going back as far as the fourteenth century for agreements or
conspiracies to fix prices.101 The ecclesiastical courts were util-
ized to aid in a curious way in enforcing such agreements. In
1344, a purser complained that the members of his gild bound
him by oath not to sell below a fixed price, and on his failure to
keep his oath brought him before the church court for perjury.1112
Constant complaints from 1320 on were made of the monopoly
96 For a complete discussion of the craft gild, see Lipson, op. cit. suprac
note 1, Chap. VIII.
97 2 Ashley, op. cit. supra note 22, at 78.
08 1 Clode, Early History of the Merchant Taylors Company (1888) 3.
99 1 Ashley, op. cit. note 22, at 90.
100 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 338, 343.
101 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 302; Leet of Nedhain and Manecroft
(1300) reported in Hudson, Leet Jurisdiction in Norwich (Selden Society,
1892) 52; Riley, Memorials of London (1868) ; see Butlond v. Austen (1507)
Select Cases in the Star Chamber (Selden Society, 1902) 262, 267.
102 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 314; UTnwin, The Gilds and Companies
of London (1908) 92.
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of the fishmongers in London.0 3 So strong were some of the
gilds that in London, for example, the fishmongers at various
times controlled the common council and elected a member as
mayor of the city.,' As early as 1321 the monopoly of the
weavers' gild was the subject of complaint.1',5 Membership in the
gilds was the chief way of securing citizenship, and for this rea-
son the gilds often acquired control of the city government.1 3
Intrenched in their control of local governments, they soon de-
veloped abuses. Obstacles were placed in the way of securing
membership. Foreigners were rigorously excluded. Admission
fees were made prohibitive so as to limit competition and prevent
the workers from themselves engaging in the trade. Thus in 1536
we find a statute reciting that the "fellowship of crafts have by
cautel and subtle means" caused "divers apprentices * * *
to be sworn upon the holy Evangelist at their first entry that they
* after their years or terms e-pired shall not set up or
open any shop *.....without the license * * * of fellow-
ship of their occupations upon pain of forfeiting their freedom
or other like penalty." 1o7 Each new member was compelled to
feast the entire gild. In 1607 complaint was made that the gild
required new members to pay "a great sum of money or make a
breakfast, dinner or supper to the whole company, which hath
been to the utter undoing of divers young men who have had little
store of money to set up their occupation withal." 103 Expensive
liveries were adopted which poorer members could not afford to
wear and cliques grew up within the gilds who controlled the
organization for the pecuniary benefit of the wealthier members."c
The number of apprentices any master could employ was severely
limited so as to keep the monopoly of the craft within a few fam-
ilies in the town.110 The capitalists emerged from the workers
and formed new organizations under monopolistic grants from
the King and became known as the "Livery Companies" because
of the ornate and expensive uniforms their members wore. The
more powerful gilds backed by wealth and political influence, en-
croached upon the rights of smaller gilds and sometimes wrecked
them. And as the gilds became exclusive we find them procur-
ing the passage of laws and ordinances making their monopoly
more effective and even letters patent from the King ordaining
10- 1 Riley, op. cit. supra. note 78, at 397; Lipson, op. ait. szpra note 1, at
337; Welsford, The Strenzgth of Nations (1907) 156, 162, 17.1, 179.
104 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 338.
10z 4 Rot. Parl. 507; 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 445.
1o Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 340, 384; 1 Ashley, op. cit.
supra note 22, at 89, 103; 2 ibid. 23.
107 (1536) 28 Hen. VIII c. 5.
103 Records of Oxford, 107, cited in Lipson, op. cit. siupra note 1, at 33.




that "no one should use that mystery unless he had been admitted
by the common consent of the same mystery." 112 In London the
weavers were in the early part of the fourteenth century indicted
for restricting output. 13 In 1327, complaint was made that the
Saddlers "by conspiracy and collusion among themselves have or-
dained * * * that no one of the aforesaid trades shall be so
daring as to sell any manner of merchandise that unto their own
trade pertains either to freemen of the city or to other persons,
but only to themselves in the business of saddlery." 114 In 1435,
the ironworkers gild was dissolved because it monopolized the
supply and lowered the quality of the iron, to the injury of the
other crafts using it.11
These abuses aroused the hostility of the common people as
well as municipal authorities who were not gild members. No
doubt, too, the powers of the gilds aroused the jealousy of the
municipal officials for they were in fact exercising quasi-govern-
mental powers. The grant of monopolies of trade to the gilds
directly by the King, in various instances, of course, seriously in-
terfered with their control by the towns and created much ill-
will.-, The fight between the gilds and the town governments
finally ended in triumph for the latter.117 In numerous ways
officials in different towns adopted varying forms of domestic
ordinances regulating the gilds. They elected officers of the gilds.
Adm'ission fees were reduced. All rules of the gilds had to be
submitted to the town authorities, otherwise they were void and
there was no hesitancy in some towns in compelling the amend-
ment or annulment of gil4 ordinances. They were denied the
right to assess fines or to compel their members to take oaths.
In some instances, the gild was abolished or the right to trade
opened to non-members. Prices of many commodities were fixed
by town authorities or officials. Wages were regulated and the
town officials likewise began to set standards of quality.
With the strengthening of the national government its power
was likewise directed toward controlling the monopolistic privi-
leges of the gilds. The royal grant of charters interfered seri-
ously with the powers of the towns to regulate these organizations
and after widespread agitation an act was passed in 1437 wherein
it was recited that the gilds "make themselves many unlawful
and unreasonable ordinances * * * for their singular profit
L12 Ibid. 77.
113 1 Riley, op. cit. supra note 78, 416 to 425; Lipson, op. sit. supra note
1, at 370.
1-4 Riley, op. cit. supra note 101, at 157; Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at
377.
215 Harris, The Coventry Leet Book (1913) 180; Lipson, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 377.
216 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 341.
117 See Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 328, ff.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 929
and common damage to the people," and provided that all gild
ordinances must be submitted to the justices of the peace or the
municipal authorities.18 This act strengthened the regulatory
powers of the town. In 1504 another act was enacted with a
recital somewhat similar, complaining further of the unreason-
able ordinances of the gilds "as well in prices of wares as other
things." -3 This act directed that all gild ordinances should be
submitted to specified judicial officers, who were in fact officers
of the nation and took away from the gilds the power to fix prices.
This law was enforced and national regulation was thereby
greatly enlarged. The gilds had acquired large funds from mem-
bers who had left part of their wealth for the saying of masses,
and these funds were misused. In 1547 a law was passed con-
fiscating all of the property of the gilds used for religious purposes
to be devoted to the erection of schools and providing for the
poor,--an action which also no doubt weakened the position of the
gilds. 1 °0 National regulation by destroying the chief function of
the gilds greatly contributed to their decay.1- ' In the meantime
the heavy burden of maintaining pageants, poor relief and other
activities, made membership less attractive. Government control
took away many of the powers of the gilds and lessened their
power to exact high prices. The exorbitant entrance fees and
other unwise regulations forced craftsmen out of the towns into
the country and neighboring villages.12
Although statutes were enacted to force back trade into the old
towns, the movement had gone too far, and henceforth the gild
monopolies faced the powerful and uncontrollable competition of
innumerable producers whose costs were necessarily lower. Thus
the foundations of great free industrial centers like Birmingham
and Manchester were laid. The irrestistible development of
business organization was forcing a division of trade into separate
organizations for manufacture and distribution. The capitalist
was becoming an important factor in commerce. The rapid
growth of distributors so excited one old writer that he complained
that "the breeding of so many merchants in London, risen out of
poor mens sons, hath been a marvellous destruction to the whole
realm." i- The whole policy of legalized monopoly so obviously
stifled the development of trade and restricted the opportunity of
citizens that the masses of the people grew more and more hostile
toward such organizations. Slowly but inexorably during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the irresistible force of
11s Ibid. 370.
119 (1503) 19 Henry VII c. 7.
120 (1547) I Edw. VI c. 14.
-12 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 436.
12 See recital of conditions in (1533) 25 Hen. VIII c. 18; 1 Cunningham,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 518.
123 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 385.
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competition broke down statutory barriers thus erected by the
Crown in the interests of the few, and the gilds lost their monop-
olies, the one legal privilege to which they clung desperately. In
1549 a law was passed striking at the heart of the gild movement.
Aimed particularly at victuallers and cooks, it provided that any
such mystery or craft which combined to raise prices should be
immediately dissolved, and also prohibited all artisans from fix-
ing prices and in various other ways regulating their trade.1-"
The abuses in the rules governing apprenticeship which were
often so designed as to perpetuate the monopoly of trade in privi-
leged families finally compelled the government to destroy the
power of the gilds in this respect.
1 2'
NATIONAL MONOPOLIES BY ROYAL PATENT
But the people were ultimately confronted with a far greater
menace than the sporadic efforts of individuals or gilds in local
markets or towns to control prices. 12 With the widening of
trade and commerce, Queen Elizabeth saw an opportunity to
strengthen and enrich the Crown by national regulation and con-
trol of industry. The practice for centuries in granting local
monopolies to gilds in the towns was applied in a national way,
despite the opposition which was everywhere springing up against
the gilds. There had been created by Edward III a few patents,
giving foreign workmen exclusive rights to new arts introduced
by them. The Queen adopted this policy for a time, issuing pat-
ents of monopoly which were in a general way similar to the
patents granted by our government. But soon unscrupulous
courtiers persuaded her to give them monopolistic rights even
over industries already established. The gravest kind of abuses
immediately arose. Private business already built up was de-
stroyed, quality was cheapened and citizens everywhere subjected
to unreasonable searches and seizures. The monopolists were
concerned chiefly with making the largest possible profits out of
their monopolies. The persons securing the monopoly of salt at
once raised the price from 16 pence to 14 shillings. 127  Although
there was deep popular dissatisfaction, fear of the power of the
Queen prevented effective action. In 1571, a member of the
House of Commons, who made complaint of existing evils was
censured for his "presumption." But six years later, the opposi-
tion in Parliament had become so strong that a bill was introduced
which had such support that the Queen was forced to make an
124 (1548) 2 & 3 Ed. VI c. 15.
125 (1562) 5 Eliz. c. 4.
126 The information contained in this paragraph is largely derived from
the following thorough research studies: Price, The English Patents of Mon-
opoly (1913) 1-22; and Gordon, Monopolies by Patent (1897).
127 Morris, Short Inquiry into the Nature of Monopoly and Forestalling
<2d ed. 1796) 26.
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appeal to the members, asking them not to "take away her pre-
rogative, which is the chiefest flower of her garden and the prin-
cipal and head pearl of her crown and diadem." Parliament
heeded her request but the Queen did nothing. In 1601, four
years later, a bill was introduced, described as, "An exposition of
the common law touching those kinds of patents commonly called
monopolies." To defeat this bill the Queen was compelled to
issue a proclamation in November of this year, in which she re-
voked the most unpopular patents, acknowledged the right of
the courts to determine the lawfulness of the remainder and
guaranteed immunity to those who might bring action in the
courts of law. The activities of the agents of the patentees seems
to have been very high-handed. One member of Parliament
spoke of them as "monstrous and unconscionable substitutes to
the Monopolitans of Starch, Tinn, Fish, Cloth, 0 yl, Vinegar, Salt,
and I know not what, nay what not? The principallest commodi-
ties both of my Town and Country are ingrossed into the hands
of these bloodsuckers of the Commonwealth." ';'
No sooner had the Queen acknowledged the right of her sub-
jects to test the validity of such monopolies in the courts, than
a proceeding was brought. Edward Darcy, Esq., Groom of the
Privy Chamber of Queen Elizabeth, had been granted the sole
right to make playing cards. A London Haberdasher had made
and sold a considerable quantity of cards much to Darcy's annoy-
ance, who brought action against him, alleging among other
things as a ground for the validity of his patent, that the Queen
"intending that her subjects being able men to exercise husbandry
should apply themselves thereto and that they should not employ
themselves in making playing cards which had not been any
ancient manual occupation in this realm, and that by making such
a multitude of cards, card playing was become much more fre-
quent and especially among servants and apprentices, and poor
artificers; to the end her subjects might apply themselves to more
lawful and necessary trades." The case was deemed of such im-
portance, affecting as it did the rights of the Crown, that it was
argued three times. Many arguments, sound, fanciful and ridic-
ulous were made, one of them being that "playing cards are but
things of vanity and the occasion of loss of time and decrease of
substance and causes of want, which is the mother of woe and
destruction and therefore it belongs to the Queen,"-which would
seem to be rather hard on the Queen. But the court refused to
adopt such specious reasoning, holding that while card-playing
might be a vanity, "the making of them is neither a vanity or a
pleasure but labour and pains." The court held such a monopoly
to be void under the common law on the grounds-(a) that all
trades furnishing employment to subjects, thus avoiding idleness,
128 2 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 288.
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are of value to the commonwealth, and an exclusive grant to ex-
ercise such a trade is against the liberty and benefit of the sub-
jects; (b) such monopolies are not only prejudicial to the traders
excluded but also to the public generally, because their insep-
arable incidents are (1) the raising of prices, (2) a deterioration
in quality and (3) the impoverishment of traders excluded. And
with a caution which even a judge was wise to employ in dealing
with Queen Elizabeth, the court suavely held that the "Queen
was deceived of her grant, for she intended it to be for the public
weal, while such a grant is to the prejudice of the public weal."
The monopoly was' also held to be unlawful on other grounds
and contrary to Acts of Parliament. This case, known as the
Case of Monopolies,"9 decided in 1602, is the great leading case,
from which has largely sprung the law condemning restraints of
trade. The famous Case of Monopolies did not settle the great
constitutional battle between the Throne and Parliament concern-
ing the power of the Crown to grant trade monopolies. At first
James I, who succeeded Queen Elizabeth, showed a disposition to
comply with the decision of the court and in 1603 issued a procla-
mation revoking several patents which Elizabeth "at the im-
portunitie of her servants, whom she was willing to reward with
little burden to her estate (otherwise by necessary occasions ex-
hausted)" had granted.130 But the King soon yielded to the im-
portunities of his courtiers, granting to them such privileges, with
the result that Parliament again discussed the abuses in 1606.
The pressure exerted on the King resulted in the issuance by him
in 1610 of a quaint book, known as the Book of Bounty wherein
he listed a number of things as to which he saw fit to "expressly
command that no suitor presume to move Us." ,31 Three years
later a court boldly held that no man could be prohibited from
working in his lawful trade because the common law abhors idle-
ness and therefore "abhors all monopolies which prohibit any man
from working in his lawful trade." 132 But the King soon forgot
his word and granted new patents with serious economic results.
The patent granted for dressing and dyeing cloth, for example,
threw the whole trade into confusion, and reacted severely on the
weavers. 3 3 By 1621 there was agitation in Parliament for the
enactment of a law against such monopolies. Proponents of
legislation prohibiting monopolies had to act warily in encroach-
ing on the King's rights, so they hit upon the happy expedient of
drawing up a statute containing verbatim a considerable part of
the King's language appearing in his Book of Bounty.134 In 1624,
"9 (1602) 11 Coke, *84 B.
"302 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 288.
'3' For a facsimile copy of this book see Gordon, op. cit. supres note 126.
132 Ipswich Taylors Case (1614) 11 Coke, *53a.
'33 2 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 294.
'34 Gordon, op. cit. supra note 126, at 2, 8.
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this law, known as the Statute of Monopolies, was enacted. It
declared monopolies to be contrary to the law, provided that the
validity of all patents be determined according to common law
practice, but excepted patents granted for new inventions.' -2
But existing monopolies still retained the powerful support of
the King.
The development of corporate organizations which permitted
groups of traders to write in a single organization and procure
a patent monopoly from the King greatly accentuated the evils
of existing monopolies. Finally, after continuous struggle be-
tween Charles I and Parliament, the Long Parliament in 1640
cancelled a number of monopolies, thus directly usurping what
was deemed to be a right of the King."" From this time on mo-
nopolies and combinations in restraint of domestic trade had no
further support from the government.
THE FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLIES
During the early middle ages, foreign trade was carried on
under great difficulties. Pirates and robbers infested trade
routes. Government in many countries was weak and could give
little protection to foreigners. Consular organizations did not
exist to protect the rights of their countrymen. The individual
trader who ventured into foreign lands risked not only his prop-
erty but also his life. It was therefore but natural that men who
desired to engage in such a trade should organize themselves in
bodies for their common protection while in foreign countries.
And following the general practice then common of procuring
monopolistic grants from the Crown, they secured from the King
so-called grants or patents giving them such exclusive rights to
trade in specified territory or countries. The earliest of these
organizations formed at the beginning of the fourteenth century
was the Merchants of the Staple. The staple was the e:port
depot through which all wool and similar merchandise exported
had to pass, and the Merchant Staplers at different times secured
a monopoly of this traffic. 37 Later there developed the powerful
and picturesque organizations aptly named the Merchant Ad-
venturers. These companies of Merchant Adventurers in the
larger cities became very influential organizations closely united,
and they often lent great aid to the Crown in its foreign rela-
tions."" Later the Levant Company, The Royal African Com-
pany, The East India Company, The Hudson Bay Company, The
Muscovy Company and others, secured for themselves the sole
right to trade in great sections of the world. Some of these com-
235 Price, op. cit. supra note 126, at 34.
23r Ibid. 46.
"17 Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 471.
338 Ibid. 474.
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panies were called regulated companies; others were joint stock
companies. The regulated companies, while given monopolies of
trade, were much like the modern trade association, their indi-
vidual members trading on their own capital but subject to the
rules prescribed by the company. Thus, although holding a mon-
opoly, there was leeway for competition between the members if
the rules permitted it. Membership was originally intended to be
freely open to any trader who desired to join, the original purpose
of the organizations being mutual protection and orderly con-
trolled trade. The joint stock companies were much like our
modern corporations, the capital being united and the company
trading as a single business unit. Its monopoly, so far as Eng-
lish competition was concerned, was therefore theoretically com-
plete. To these great trade organizations the far flung develop-
ment of the British Empire is in no small degree attributable.
They exercised functions of the government in territories where
no real government existed, supporting forts, soldiers and ad-
ministrative officials. They were able to secure many privileges
from governments, which would have been beyond the reach of
the single trader. They regulated the quality of the articles
exported to a considerable extent. They fixed minimum prices
at a high level which members were not permitted to cut, forbade
secret trading, compelled a division of trade among the members
and protected the person and property of their members against
violence and extortion.139 In dealing with uncivilized communi-
ties some such organization was essential.
But soon agitation began to arise against the abuses resulting
from their monopoly. In 1550 we find clothiers complaining that
the Merchant Adventurers "by agreement set such a price upon
their cloths that without the loss of twenty shillings in a piece,
they could not utter them." 140 Again in 1604 we read in the
Journals of the House of Commons of the price-fixing activities of
this organization.141 "The clothiers," runs the complaint, "hav-
ing no utterance of their cloth but to the Merchant Adventurers,
they by complot among themselves will buy at what time, what
quantity and what price, themselves list: whereby the clothiers
are fain often to return with loss, to lay their cloths to pawn, to
stock their trade-to the utter ruin of their poor workmen with
their wives and children." The monopoly of trade to foreign
countries likewise sometimes gave to such companies a monopoly
of the products of such countries for importation into England.
The House of Commons report in 1604 in denouncing the Mus-
covy Company which monopolized the trade to and from Russia
said, "This is a strong and shameful monopoly, a monopoly in a
139 Ibid. 491; 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 220.
140.Acts, of the Privy Council (1550-1552) 19, cited in Lipson, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 428.
141 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 218.
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monopoly, both abroad and at home, a whole Company by this
means, is become as one man, who alone hath the uttering of all
the Commodities of so great a country." 142 In 1604 complaint
was made in the House of Commons of "the engrossing and re-
straint of trade" of such companies by a coterie of London merch-
ants. But a bill designed in part to abrogate "those orders in
Companies which tend to Monopoly" which was introduced in
the House of Commons was successfully devitalized by the House
of Lords.143 A few more years experience, however, proved the
necessity of regulation and the King in 1622 issued a proclamation
which required all ordinances of such companies to be submitted
to the Privy Council. This proclamation read:
"And whereas a suspition hath been raised upon the Societies
and Companyes of the Merchant Adventurers and other Merch-
ants, and of some Companyes of Handicrafts Men, that for their
private Gains and particular Advantage they make and put in
Execution divers Ordinances amongst themselves for ordering
their Trades and Mysteries, which tend to the hurt of the pub-
lique, we will and command you, and hereby give you Power and
Authoritie, uppon any Complaint to be made unto you thereof,
to enform yourselves of the Ordinances, Orders and Constitutions
of such Companyes and Societies of Merchants and others for the
ordering of their Trade, to the end that if it shall appeare that any
thing therein contayned be unfitt to be contynued, as tending to
the generall hurt of others, either in the making of Cloth, or other
M1erchandize and Wares of this Kingdome over deare or other-
wise, that the same may be laid down, and that no new Orders or
Ordinances be hereafter made and executed by the said Com-
panyes or any of them, before they be first perused and allowed
by Us and our Privie Councell, or so many of them as we shall
thereunto especially appoint." 144
In 1642 the monopolistic restrictions were removed and foreign
trade made free to all Englishmen."5 Evincing some of the criti-
cisms of the times is this excerpt from an old pamphlet published
in 1645 which claims that the patent of monopolies given to the
Merchant Adventurers-
"trencheth upon the native Rights of the freeborn subject: which
Patent hath been often complained of and clamored against from
time to time, as an universall greevance to Town and Countrey,
tending to the diminution of Trade, and of all sorts of Manufac-
tures at home and to the disrepute of the policy of this Nation
abroad, the sayd Patent being accounted no lesse amongst all
people, then a Monopoly, a word odious all the world over." "-
But the experiment was premature and after a few years experi-
ence the rights of the companies were re-established.
142Ibid. 220.
1-431 JOURNALS oF THE Hous- o ComroNs (1604) 219.
24 17 Rymer Foedera (1869) 413; 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supia note 14, at
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45 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 218.
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The record of the 17th century is a record of continuous com-
plaint against the practices of these monopolies. It was charged
that they refused to meet the price competition of their foreign
competitors, particularly the French, thus letting them secure the
major portion of the trade to the harm of English workmen and
producers.147 It was claimed that they favored the.products of
one section of the country over another.148 Their exorbitant fees
for membership adopted for the purpose of excluding traders and
keeping the membership limited, compelled the government to
take action to reduce them.1 49  There was also, of course, bitter
opposition to such companies by independent traders, who en-
deavored with increasing success to encroach upon the rights of
the monopolistic companies, such as the East India Company,
which were given political and judicial power and did not hesitate
to inflict the severest kind of penalties on competitors in their
territory who came within their power.1 10 The East India
Company likewise spent large sums for the corruption of public
officers. Even in an age when corruption of public servants was
somewhat common, its activities created a national scandal. An
inquiry by the House of Lords in 1693 developed the fact that this
one company had spent £90,000 for such purposes, some of which
went to the King.'5' In some instances officials of such compa-
nies took advantage of their official positions to carry on a private
business of their own at a great profit.152 The American colonists
who had developed a considerable shipping industry were excluded
from this trade and were also hostile.153 It was charged, too, that
the companies were inefficient. It was claimed that "Exclusive
companies have so many directors, supercargoes, factors, agents,
keepers and clerks and these must have so many fees and sweet-
enings from manufacturers to procure the preference of their
goods that it is impossible for them, if they had an inclination to
do it, to trade upon an equal footing with private adventurers
Trade * * * engrossed by a company of men who stile themselves Mer-
chant Adventurers. Brit. Mus. 712 g. 16 (2) ; 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 231.
147A General Treatise on Naval Trade and Commerce (2d ed. 1763) 32.
14s Reasons humbly offered that Merchant Adventurers are detrimontal to
England and especially to Devonshire. Brit. Mus. 712 g, 16 (8); 1 Cun-
ningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 232.
149 (1699) 10 & 11 Will. III, c. 6; Lipson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 493.
150 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 267; Lipson, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 492.
151 1 Miil, History of British India (3d ed. 1826) 115; 1 Cunningham, op.
cit. supra, note 14, at 268.
152 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 277.
153 Ibid. 271.
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and as they cannot trade so cheap, they must neglect many lesser
branches which would turn to good account in the hands of indi-
viduals and give bread to thousands." 25
Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations charged that such
monopolies were against the public interest not only because they
excluded other Englishmen from the trades, and exacted exor-
bitant prices but also were guilty of extraordinary waste and
fraud.1 The resentment against and opposition to such organ-
izations steadily increased and one by one they lost their exclusive
privileges, although one, The Hudson Bay Company, retained its
monopolistic rights until 1869.*; When government was weal:
and foreign trade perilous, the great companies were well nigh
essential organizations in the great pioneer work of developing
foreign trade and as instruments through which the government
could in a measure regulate export commerce. But with the
strengthening of governments the world over, with the establish-
ment of world-wide consular systems and the establishment of
law and order in most parts of the world, this need largely passed
for international commerce and the rights of aliens could be more
fairly regulated and protected by treaties between sovereign na-
tions. The corruption of the government, the inefficiency, the
denial of the right of free men to engage freely in foreign trade,
the obvious harm to the national interests in the curtailment of
the expansion of world trade which resulted in restricting the
free play of individual initiative and enterprise, and other evils
which flowed from such monopolies created a popular hostility
which made their abolition inevitable and in the latter part of the
eighteenth century these great organizations were shorn of their
powers and monopolistic privileges.
In the latter years of the eighteenth century there developed
a spirit of individualism which shattered the monopolistic system
and revolutionized the relations between government and indus-
try. With the purpose of fostering trade the government, as has
been shown, enacted the most stringent laws against forestalling
of local markets. It had granted monopolies to the gilds, patent
monopolies of domestic trade to individuals, monopolies of foreign
trade to great trading companies, and through protective tariffs,
navigation acts and minute regulations, had protected the domes-
tic trader against foreign competition. For several hundred
years the opposition to such an artificial control of trade had
grown more intense. Now a new development added tremendous
force to the opposition. The industrial revolution, resulting from
an amazing development of machinery in manufacture had pro-
duced great manufacturers of powerful influence. Their greatly
-4Op. cit. supra note 147, at 33.
15 2 Smith, op. cit. supra note 67, Book iv, chap. vii, Part iii.
156 1 Cunningham, op. cit. supra note 14, at 279.
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increased production not only had to reach national markets but
also the markets of the world. Local laws restricting the free
movement of goods, gild monopolies, tariffs which brought about
foreign discriminations, all aroused their hostility. They became
powerful proponents of laissez-faire policies, and individualism.' "
They were hostile to the merchants and small manufacturers who
clung to the monopolistic ideas. Economists, such as Adam
Smith, condemned both the "wretched spirit of monopoly" and
"the sophistry of merchants inspired by the spirit of monop-
oly." 158 The cumulative force of all these divergent interests
forced the abolition of monopoly and the establishment of a gov-
ernment policy designed to secure freedom of trade to every Eng-
lish citizen.
Thus through the centuries the policy of legalized monopoly was
adopted in England in one form after another only to be forced
out of existence as the masses of men became free and the power
of government passed to the people. Monopolies of the markets,
the towns, the nation and of foreign trade were all discarded
upon the insistence of the people who demanded freedom of trade
in order that every individual should have opportunity to win
the commercial success to which his initiative and ability entitled
him, and that the trade of the country might expand under the
stimulus flowing from the ambitious competition of the freemen
of a great nation. So that by the time the American colonies
became a free and independent nation, the irresistible expansion
of trade had largely wrecked the paternalistic control of industry
by government and was ushering in a great new era of unre-
stricted individualism and free competition.
(To be continued)
I G Bowden, Industrial Society in England towards the End of the Eigh-
teenth Century (1925) 193.
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